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NAVIGATING BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD
PLACE: AN EMPLOYER'S OBLIGATION TO
REASONABLY ACCOMMODATE THE DISABLED
IN THE UNIONIZED WORKPLACE
Peter is a production employee with many years of service with his
current employer. Over the years Peter performed his duties well. Un-
fortunately, an accident left Peter with a physical impairment which in-
hibits his ability to perform his current job duties. Peter's employer con-
sidered several options to accommodate Peter's disability and allow him
to remain in his current position. Without an accommodation, Peter's
inability to do his job would result in his termination. Unfortunately,
Peter's employer was unable to accommodate Peter's disability through
modification of his job tasks or the work area. The employer's inability
to accommodate Peter, within his current position, was based on the
inefficiency, financial costs, and/or the impact of the proposed modifi-
cations on other employees.
Peter requested a transfer to an open front desk position where his
disability would not inhibit performance of job tasks. Because front desk
positions are highly sought after, the collective bargaining agreement
between Peter's employer and the labor organization that represents Pe-
ter and his co-workers limits the front desk position to employees who
obtain a minimum level of seniority. Because Peter does not meet this
seniority requirement, the employer refuses Peter's transfer.
Peter, who is now faced with unemployment, files a complaint alleg-
ing discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
(ADA).1 Peter argues that the ADA requires his employer to take rea-
sonable steps to accommodate his disability. Peter interprets the ADA's
accommodation provisions to require reassignment, even if the employer
would violate the terms of its collective bargaining agreement with the
union.
Peter's employer is aware that accommodating a requested transfer
contravenes the collective bargaining agreement's seniority provisions.
The employer believes this reassignment, without a union-waiver, would
constitute a unilateral modification of the collective bargaining agree-
ment, which is prohibited under the National Labor Relations Act
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 - 12211 (1994).
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(NLRA).2 Peter's employer believes the binding terms of a valid collec-
tive bargaining agreement supersede its obligation to provide an ac-
commodation under the ADA. The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) does not share the employer's interpretation of the
ADA accommodation requirement. The EEOC interpretation is similar
to Peter's. Consequently, Peter's employer is caught between two com-
peting federal statutory obligations. These dueling obligations consist of
the duty to accommodate a disabled employee under the ADA and the
prohibition against unilateral contract modification under the NLRA. To
accommodate Peter, the employer may violate the NLRA, whereas not
accommodating Peter may violate the ADA.
As disabled employees become better informed of their rights under
the ADA, the fact pattern presented will become more of a reality. Both
the ADA and NLRA serve compelling interests and protect legitimate
constituent concerns. Adherence to one, while violating the other, could
subject an employer to expensive fines, sanctions, and attorney fees.4
The employer's dilemma is the result of contrary interpretations of the
ADA's reasonable accommodation requirement by the EEOC and the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). These agencies are unwilling
or unable to agree on the precise impact that collective bargaining
agreements have on an employer's duty of accommodation. Therefore,
employers and employees are forced to look to the courts for guidance
in interpreting the ADA and NLRA obligations.
An employer's accommodation of an employee's disability through
reassignment, either without the consent of the union, or in violation of
the terms of the labor agreement, violates several provisions of the
NLRA.5 A federal labor policy that seeks to encourage labor stability
and the historic deference accorded seniority rights prompted several
circuits to override the rights of unionized disabled employees as out-
lined in the ADA and to find that accommodations that violate the pro-
visions of a collective bargaining agreement are unreasonable. 6 Some
2. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1994).
3. Robert A. Dubault, Note, The ADA and the NLRA: Balancing Individual
and Collective Rights, 70 IND. L.J. 1271, 1284 (1995).
4. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 12117(a), 12205; see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 162,
187 (violating statutory provisions could result in fines, sanctions, attorney fees).
5. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5); see also 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (banning
unilateral contract modification).
6. See, e.g., Eckles v. Consolidated Rail, 94 F.3d 1041 (7th Cir. 1996); see
also Kralik v. Durbin, 130 F.3d 76 (3rd Cir. 1997); Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox
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courts argue that a per se bar to accommodation through reassignment is
necessary to protect the collectively bargained rights of all employees.7
This application of a per se bar is not universal. 8 A minority of courts
held that seniority provisions, which conflict with an accommodation
under the ADA, are only one factor in determining the reasonableness of
that accommodation. 9
This Comment rejects the use of a per se bar to accommodation when
such an accommodation violates the seniority provisions of a collective
bargaining agreement. Instead, this Comment argues that the courts
should apply a balancing test that evaluates the interests of employees,
employers, and the public's interest in labor stability and eradication of
workplace discrimination.
Section I is an introduction to the Americans with Disabilities Act and
the National Labor Relation Act. The summary of the ADA focuses on
the employment discrimination provisions in Title I, including defini-
tions of a reasonable accommodation and undue hardship. This section
also focuses on the EEOC's interpretation of the ADA's reasonable ac-
commodation provisions, and reviews the applicable statutory language
of the NLRA, including employer obligations under the Act, potential
conflicts between those obligations and the provisions of the ADA, and
the position the National Labor Relations Board adopts with regard to
any conflicts between the ADA and NLRA. Section I concludes with a
brief analysis of similar conflicts under analogous statutes.
Section II of this Comment undertakes a review and analysis of the
two leading cases that articulate the rationale for and against the per se
rule for determining employer accommodation obligations under the
ADA, Eckles v. Consolidated Railways Corp.,10 and Aka v. Washington
Co., 117 F.3d 800 (5th Cir. 1997); Benson v. Northwest Airlines, 62 F.3d 1108 (8th
Cir. 1995); Milton v. Scrivner, 53 F.3d 1118 (10th Cir. 1995) (determining that
reassignmment would violate the seniority rights of other employees).
7. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Aka v. Washington Hospital Center, 116 F.3d 876 (D.C. Cir.
1997), vacated pending rehearing en banc, 124 F.3d 1302 (D.C. Cir. 1997), re-
hearing en banc, 1998 No. 96-7089, WL 698396, remanded, (D.C. Cir. Oct. 9,
1998).
9. See id. Other factors include the potential disruption to the employer's
workforce and/or operational structure. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630 & app. (1998); Aka,
116 F.3d at 895.
10. 94 F.3d 1041 (7th Cir. 1996).
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Hospital Center.1
Finally, section III rejects the use of collective bargaining agreements
as a bright line test for determining the reasonableness of an accommo-
dation under the ADA. Instead, section III proposes a balancing test that
analyzes the accommodation's actual infringement on seniority rights,
its associated employer costs, and the public's concern for labor stabil-
ity. These factors are balanced against the ADA's strong social policy
which makes it unlawful to discriminate against the disabled. A balanc-
ing test is more in line with Congress's intent that multiple factors be
considered.
I. STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS AND AGENCY GUIDANCE:
EMPLOYER OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE ADA AND NLRA
A. The ADA: Protecting and Enlarging Employment
Opportunities for the Disabled
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ensures "equality of op-
portunity, full participation, independent living and economic self-
sufficiency" for disabled individuals.1 2 The ADA prohibits discrimina-
tion against a disabled individual in four areas: (1) employment, (2)
housing, (3) public accommodations, and (4) transportation. 3 The ADA
extends'the rights, which are guaranteed disabled individuals under sec-
tion 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (Rehabilitation Act) to the private
sector.14 The Rehabilitation Act prohibits discrimination against handi-
capped individuals "by federal agencies, private employers with federal
contracts and recipients of federal funds." 15 It also "imposes an obliga-
tion on federal employers and contractors to undertake affirmative ac-
tion on behalf of the handicapped."' 6 The ADA extends this federal
sector protection to the private sector.
11. 116F.3d876(D.C. Cir. 1997).
12. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (1994).
13. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 - 12117 (providing that subchapter
one addresses employment, subchapter two addresses housing, subchapter three
addresses public accommodations, and subchapter four addresses transportation).
14. See Joanne Jocha Ervin, Reasonable Accommodation and the Collective
Bargaining Agreement Under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 1991
DET. C.L. REv. 925,926 (1991).
15. Id
16. Id
1998] Reasonable Accommodations in the Unionized Workplace 249
Title I of the ADA addresses employment.17 Title I prohibits employ-
ers18 front discriminating against disabled individuals in "hiring, ad-
vancement, or discharge" or any other "terms, conditions and privileges
of employment." 19 The ADA requires an employer who is aware of an
employee's disability to take reasonable measures to accommodate that
disability.20 The ADA requires the employer to identify possible ac-
commodations and evaluate the reasonableness of the accommodation,
including any possible negative effects on the employer.21 The ADA
defines a reasonable accommodation as "any change in the work envi-
ronment or in the way a job is typically performed which will enable the
[disabled] individual to enjoy equal employment opportunities."
22
For Tit]e I protection under the ADA, an employee must qualify as an
individual "who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can per-
form the ,essential functions of the employment position that such indi-
vidual holds or desires."23 When a qualified employee requests an ac-
commodation, the employer must consider that request.24 Once an em-
ployee submits a request, the employer undertakes a multi-step process
to determine whether an accommodation is reasonable. 25 An accommo-
dation includes, but is not limited to, modification of the work site, po-
sition restructuring, modification of the work schedule, acquisition of
special equipment or devices to assist the employee, or reassignment to
17. See42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117.
18. A covered entity under the ADA is "an employer, employment agency,
labor organization or joint labor management committee." See id. § 12111(2).
19. d. § 12112(a).
20. See id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
21. See generally 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9 (1998) (discussing steps an employer
would undertake in making a reasonable accommodation).
22. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9).
23. Id. § 12111 (8). See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2 (1990). Essential
functions are job responsibilities that are fundamental, not marginal, aspects of the
position. See id.
24. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(c)(2XA); see also H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2,
at 65.
25. See id The review process involves four steps: (1) the employer in
conjunction with the employee must identify and distinguish' the essential aspects
of the job; identify the abilities and limitations of the employee as well as barriers
to performing the essential job functions, (2) the employer must identify, again in
conjunction with the employee, possible accommodations, (3) the reasonableness
of the identified accommodations must be weighed, and (4) the selected
accommodation is implemented. See id
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a vacant position if accommodation in the employee's current position
proves unfeasible.26 An employer's failure to accommodate "the known
physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual,"
when it is reasonable to do so, is a violation of the ADA.27
In defense of a decision not to grant an accommodation, an employer
may argue that the accommodation would result in undue hardship.
28
Undue hardship is defined as "an action requiring significant difficulty
or expense." 29 The undue hardship defense protects employers from un-
dertaking accommodations that may result in a detrimental economic
impact on business operations.3 0 An accommodation that is "extensive,
substantial, or disruptive, or that would fundamentally alter the nature or
operation of the business" could result in undue hardship." The ADA
requires consideration of several factors when determining whether an
accommodation creates an undue hardship. 2 These factors include the
nature and cost of the accommodation,33 the overall financial resources
of the facility making the accommodation, 34 and the operational struc-
ture of the facility. a5 However, these factors are not exclusive.36 No one
factor is determinative of whether an accommodation will result in un-
due hardship.37 The EEOC and the legislative history of the ADA sug-
gest a flexible, case by case approach to determine whether the em-
ployer has demonstrated undue hardship.
38
In attempting to comply with the ADA, an employer may find that an
accommodation violates federal labor law. This may occur when the
accommodation sought by the employee violates the terms of a collec-
26. See42 U.S.C. § 12111(9).
27. See id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
28. See id. § 1211 1(10)(A); see also 29 C.F.R.§ 1630.15(d) (1998).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A).
30. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3 at 41 (1990).
31. See id.
32. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B).
33. See id.
34. See id. This factor would also include the accommodation's impact on
the operation of the facility. See id.
35. See id. § 12111(10)(B)(iv).
36. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 41-42 (1990); see also 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630 & app. (1998).
37. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at41.
38. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 41-42; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630 &
app. (1998).
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tive bargaining agreement.3 9 The language of the ADA does not specifi-
cally address collective bargaining agreements and its effect on the em-
ployer's obligation to accommodate. 40 This omission in the statutory
language led to divergent interpretations and court decisions concerning
collective bargaining agreements and seniority provisions. 41 When
promulgating the ADA, Congress did not clearly express a per se rule
favoring collective bargaining agreements over the employer obligations
to the disabled mandated in Title 1.42 In addition, Congress also failed to
state that the employer obligations of the ADA would supersede em-
ployer requirements under collective bargaining agreements. 43 Adminis-
trative agencies, experts, and courts have been left to fashion individual
interpretations of the impact of collective bargaining agreements on the
reasonableness of accommodations under the ADA.
B. The EEOC Interpretative Guidelines
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission devises regulations
and guidelines to administer and enforce the provisions of the ADA.
44
The EEOC views the ADA as similar to other civil rights laws that pro-
hibit discrimination in employment.45 As with other civil rights laws, the
ADA does not require preferences favoring protected disabled employ-
ees over other employees.46 To accommodate a disabled employee how-
ever, the EEOC interprets the ADA as allowing employers to reassign
the disabled employee to a vacant position over more senior
39. See, e.g., Kralik v. Durbin, 130 F.3d 76 (3rd Cir. 1997); Foreman v.
Bab-cock & Wilcox Co., 117 F.3d 800 (5th Cir. 1997); Aka v. Washington
Hospital Center, 116 F.3d 876 (D.C. Cir. 1997), vacated pending rehearing en
banc, 124 F.3d 1302 (D.C. Cir. 1997), rehearing en banc, 1998 No. 96-7089, WL
698396, remanded, (D.C. Cir. Oct. 9, 1998); Eckles v. Consolidated Rail, 94 F.3d
1041 (7th Cir. 1996); Benson v. Northwest Airlines, 62 F.3d 1108 (8th Cir. 1995);
Milton v. Scrivner, 53 F.3d 1118 (10th Cir. 1995); Buckingham v. United States,
998 F.2d 7:.15 (9th Cir. 1993) (analyzing whether an accommodation of reassign-
ment was pe;rmissible if it violated the terms of a seniority agreement).
40. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102 - 12117 (1994).
41. See generally Eckles, 94 F.3d 1041 (holding seniority provision is a bar
to accommcdation); Aka, 116 F.3d at 895 (holding seniority provision is only one
of several factors to be considered).
42. See Aka, 116 F.3d at 894-95. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 12101.
43. S ee42U.S.C.§ 12101.
44. See42U.S.C.§ 12117 (1994).
45. See29 C.F.R. § 1630 & app. (1998).
46. See id.
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employees.47
Under the EEOC's interpretation, collective bargaining agreements
are only one consideration in determining whether the accommodation is
a hardship.48 According to the EEOC, more than a de minimis impact on
the employer is necessary to qualify the accommodation as an undue
hardship.49 While collective bargaining agreements and/or seniority
rights are relevant, and should be given strong consideration, they
should not alone bar accommodation of disabled employees. 50 The
EEOC suggests that labor organizations and employers negotiate modi-
fications to collective bargaining agreements when these agreements
interfere with the only available accommodation. 51 However, practitio-
ners have rejected this solution as unworkable. 52 The EEOC's interpre-
tation is in conflict with the National Labor Relations Board.
C. The NLRA: Valuing Collectively Bargained
Employment Rights
The NLRA regulates the relationship between employers and labor
organizations. 53 The objective of promulgating federal labor law is to
eliminate obstructions to the free flow of commerce caused by "strikes
and other forms of industrial unrest." 54 The NLRA attempts to achieve
this goal by encouraging and regulating the collective bargaining proc-
ess.55 The NLRA enables employees to select an agent, usually a union,
47. See 29 C.F.R. § 1.630.2(O)(2)(ii) (1998).
48. See id. § 1630. App.
49. Id "[T]o demonstrate undue hardship pursuant to the ADA and this part
an employer must show substantially more difficulty or expense than [under Title
VIII." Id Under Title VII, requiring an employer to bear more than a de minimis
cost is an undue hardship. Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 424 U.S. 63, 84
(1976).
50. See Labor Pact Held No Automatic Bar to Employer's Disabilities Act
Claim, DAiLY LAB. REP. (BNA), June 25, 1997, at AA- 1.
51. See EEOC Would Require Negotiations, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), Apr.
9, 1996, at A-3.
52. See id
53. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1994) (describing the purpose for creat-
ing the NLRA).
54. Id. § 151 (1994).
55. See id (the United States seeks to eliminate obstructions to commerce
"by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining.. .").
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to represent their interests before an employer.5 6 The NLRA assumes
collective bargaining over the terms and conditions of employment is
the best method of protecting the interest of employees in the
workplace.57
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) has the
authority to "make, amend, and rescind" rules and regulations necessary
to carry out the provisions of the NLRA. 58 The Board has a correspond-
ing duty to interpret labor laws and regulations in a manner that avoids
conflict with the stated objectives of other federal laws.59 When an em-
ployer's actions, taken in order to comply with another federal law, such
as the ADA, conflicts with the employer's duty under the NLRA, the
employer may offer the conflicting law as a defense to NLRA viola-
tions.6°
In evaluating this defense, the Board inquires into whether the action
demanded by the conflicting federal statute is discretionary for an em-
ployer, or whether the conflicting federal law mandates that an employer
take a specific action.61 Theoretically, an employer may defend against a
violation of federal labor law by establishing that the action undertaken
was mandated by an opposing federal law.62 However, if the Board de-
termines an employer has discretion in complying with the opposing
law, the employer may not defend its action with the conflicting
statute.63 The NLRB has rejected compliance with the ADA as a de-
fense to a violation of the NLRA.64
Employe rs who are subject to collective bargaining agreements should
56. See id. § 157; see also Estella J. Schoen, Note, Does the ADA Make
Exceptions in a Unionized Workplace? The Conflict Between the Reassignment
Provision of the ADA and Collectively Bargained Seniority Systems, 82 MiNN L.
REv. 1391, 1396 (1998).
57. See Richard A. Bales, The Discord Between Collective Bargaining and
Individual Employment Rights: Theoretical Origins and a Proposed
Reconciliation, 77 B.U. L. REV. 687,689 (1997).
58. See 29 U.S.C. § 156(1994).
59. See Bozeman Deaconess Pound. v. Montana Nurses Ass'n, 322
N.L.R.B. 1107,1119 (1997).
60. See N.L.R.B: Memorandum on Collective Bargaining and the ADA,
Americans with Disabilities Act Manual (BNA), No. 8, 70:1021, at 89 (Aug. 7,
1992).
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exercise caution when seeking to modify any aspect of the employment
relationship.65 Accommodation of an employee's disability, without the
consent of the employee representative or labor union, may subject the
employer to an "unfair labor practice" (ULP) charge." The employer's
duty to bargain in good faith prohibits implementing changes in working
conditions or terms of employment, without providing notice to the em-
ployee's representative and/or an "opportunity to bargain" over that
change. 67 That does not imply that all modifications to the terms of em-
ployment result in an ULP. A unilateral change in working conditions
must be substantial, material, and significant to violate section 8(a)(5) of
the NLRA, and qualify as an unfair labor practice.68
A "within position', 69 accommodation is most likely not a material
contract alteration, and therefore not subject to collective bargaining
restraints.70 A "within position" accommodation is a change in the man-
ner in which a job is performed, such as a restructuring of job responsi-
bilities or physical changes to the worksite.
71
An "outside position 72 accommodation, however, is material and
therefore subject to collective bargaining. 73 An "outside position" ac-
commodation alters the terms of employment as defined in the collective
bargaining agreement. 74 A reassignment that is inconsistent with an es-
tablished employment practice, such as a seniority system, would most
likely qualify as an "outside position" accommodation. 75 The reassign-
ment may constitute a violation of the NLRA if the employer imposed it
65. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1994) (listing activities, such as unilat-
eral contract modification, that are violations of the NLRA).
66. See id. § 158(a), (d) (1994).
67. See N.L.R.B. Memorandum, supra note 60, at 90.
68. See id; see also 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5).
69. "A within-position accommodation... permits a disabled employee to
perform all of the essential functions of the position for which he is hired through a
change in the manner in which the job is done." Richard McAtee, The Americans
with Disabilities Act and the NLRA: A Unionized Employment Roadmap to
Reasonable Accommodation, 33 DUQ. L. REV. 105, 109 (1994).
70. See id. at 109-10.
71. Seeid.
72. "An outside position accommodation entails reassignment to a position
where the employee can perform all the essential functions ..... Id at 109.
73. Seeid at 110.
74. See id. at 109.
75. See N.L.R.B. Memorandum, supra note 60, at 89-90.
1998] Reasonable Accommodations in the Unionized Workplace 255
without bargaining, and/or over the opposition of the union. 6
The General Counsel of the NLRB recognized that implementing the
terms of the ADA could result in conflicts between an employer's obli-
gations under the NLRA and the ADA. 77 As a result, the General Coun-
sel drafted guidelines for the NLRB staff when confronted with con-
flicting statutory requirements under the ADA and NLRA.78
D. NLRB: An Administrative Response to the ADA
According to the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations
Board, the ADA does not mandate preemption of the terms of the col-
lective bargaining agreement when a reassignment is requested due to
disability.7" Therefore, if an employer commits an "unfair labor prac-.
tice" by making a unilateral change in conditions of employment, such
as an unauthorized reassignment; the ADA cannot be argued as a de-
fense.80 The General Counsel bases the employer's obligation to ac-
commodate under the ADA on several factors. These factors include the
employer's defense of undue hardship,81 the absence of a per se rule in
the statutory language, the legislative history of the ADA, and the EEOC
interpretative guidelines.82 Due to these factors, the General Counsel
interprets an employer's obligation to accommodate through reassign-
ment as discretionary, not mandatory.8 3 Therefore, under the General
Counsel's ;analysis, the ADA is no defense to a ULP for unilateral con-
tract modification.
The NLRB ratified the position of the NLRB's General Counsel.8 An
employer's failure to obtain the union's consent to a change in employee
job descriptions, in order for the job descriptions to comply with the
76. See id.
77. See id. at 90.
78. The duties of the General Counsel include supervising and directing
staff attorneys of the N.L.R.B. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994).
79. See N.L.R.B. Memorandum supra note 60, at 89.
80. See id. at 90.
81. See id. The undue hardship defense allows the employer an alternative
route other than violating the terms of the collective bargaining agreement; there-
fore the employer has discretion. See generally id.
82. See id.; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(e) (1997) (stating the EEOC al-
lows other federal law as possible defense).
83. See N.L.R.B. Memorandum, supra note 60, at 90.
84. See Bozeman Deaconess Found. v. Montana Nurses Ass'n, 322
N.L.R.B. 1107, 1119 (1997).
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ADA, was a material change in working conditions, and violated section
8(d) of the NLRA.s5 The Board held that "the employer has a duty to
bargain with the labor organization regarding reasonable accommoda-
tions and may not make unilateral changes that result in significant
workplace changes."
86
With this decision, the NLRB clearly expressed its position that the
terms of a collective bargaining agreement are impenetrable.87 The terms
may not be breached by competing federal laws, notwithstanding the
compelling public policy concerns of those other laws.8 The NLRB
firmly believes that collectively bargained employee rights take prece-
dence over individual employment rights.89
The EEOC and the NLRB formulated a procedure to collectively ad-
dress claims that arise simultaneously under both the ADA and the
NLRA.90 The agreement allows each agency to direct its own investiga-
tion, but'withholds discharge of a complaint until each agency has com-
pleted its investigation.91 The agreement also directs the agencies to
consult one another when a charge involves interpretation of the other's
92statute. However, this NLRB and EEOC Procedural Memorandum of
Understanding only addresses procedural issues and does not address
conflicts that arise out of the opposing statutory obligations, and does
not offer guidance for how employers confronted with the conflict
should proceed.93
E. Resolution of Seniority Rights Conflicts under Analogous
Civil Rights Statutes
The struggle between federal anti-discrimination laws and labor law is





89. See Bozeman Deaconess Found, 322 N.L.R.B. at 1119.
90. See generally NLRB and EEOC: Procedural Memorandum of
Understanding, AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT MANUAL (BNA) No. 23,




94. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977);
Franks v. Bowman Transportation Company, Inc., 424 U.S. 747 (1975) (analyzing
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the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) has addressed this same issue.95
1. The Rehabilitation Act
The Rehabilitation Act is the precursor to the ADA. 96 It prohibits dis-
crimination against handicapped individuals by "federal agencies, pri-
vate employers with federal contracts and [other] recipients of federal
funds. 97 Case law uniformly holds that the rights conferred by the Re-
habilitation Act cannot prevail over rights created by a bona fide senior-
ity system."8 In Daubert v. United States Postal Service,99 the court de-
termined that seniority provisions under a collective bargaining agree-
ment were a "legitimate business reason" to deny the reassignment of a
disabled employee who was unable to meet the seniority requirements of
the position.0 ODaubert, and similar rulings, established a bar to accom-
conflicts between federal labor law and Title VII); see also Carter v. Tisch, 822
F.2d 465 (4th Cir. 1987); Jansany v. United States Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244 (6th
Cir. 1985); Daubert v. United States Postal Serv., 733 F.2d 1367 (10th Cir. 1984)
(analyzing conflicts between federal labor law and the Rehabilitation Act).
95. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977); Franks
v. Bowman Transportation Company, Inc., 424 U.S. 747 (1975) (analyzing
conflicts between- federal labor law and Title VII); see also Carter v. Tisch, 822
F.2d 465 (4th Cir. 1987); Jansany v. United States Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244 (6th
Cir. 1985); Daubert v. United States Postal Serv., 733 F.2d 1367 (10th Cir. 1984)
(analyzing conflicts between federal labor law and the Rehabilitation Act).
96. See Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1046 (7th Cir.
1996); see also Ervin, supra note 14, at 926.
97. Ervyin, supra note 14, at 925-26. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 791(a) (1994)
(barring exclusion, denial of benefits, discrimination of the disabled by those re-
ceiving fedeial funds).
98. See Daubert, 733 F.2d at 1369-70; see also Carter, 822 F.2d at 467;
Jansany, 755 F.2d at 1251-52.
99. 713 F.2d at 1367. Plaintiff was fired from her position because of a
disability that prevented her from performing the duties of the position. See id. at
1369. Plaintiff alleged that she was illegally terminated due to her handicap. See
id. The distiict court held that although the plaintiff had established a prima facie
case of discrimination, the employer had presented a legitimate business reason for
the discrimination. See id. Employer-defendant argued that the provisions of the
national contract prohibited it from modifying the requirements of the plaintiffs
current position or, in the alternative, reassigning her to a light duty position
requiring a level of seniority the plaintiff did not possess. See id. The Tenth Cir-
cuit reviewed whether the employer should be allowed to rely on the collective
bargaining agreement as a defense to plaintiff's dismissal. See id.
100. See id. at 1370.
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modation under the Rehabilitation Act when such accomodation con-
flicted with the terms of a collective bargaining agreement.'
0 '
2. The Civil Rights Act of 1964
The purpose of Title VII is to eliminate discrimination in the work-
place based on "race, sex, religion and national origin."'02 Additionally,
Title VII requires employers to provide some form of accommodation
for employees protected by the statute.10 3 Much like the ADA, Title VII
provides little guidance for determining the degree of accommodation
required.104
In Franks v. Bowman, 05 job applicants who successfully demon-
strated discrimination in hiring sought seniority as part of the remedy for
the employer's past discrimination.106 The employer and union argued
against awarding retroactive seniority. 0 7 The employer and union ar-
gued that to grant retroactive seniority to newly hired employees would
displace the economic interest of other employees, who were innocent
bystanders to the employer's illegal conduct. 0 8 The Supreme Court dis-
agreed, holding that to disallow the award of retroactive seniority would
undermine the remedial provisions of Title VII. 109 Absent statutory lan-
guage or legislative history indicating remedial limits, the award of ret-
roactive seniority was a proper exercise of judicial power, even though
it interfered with the rights of other employees. "
0
In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison,"' however, the Supreme
Court stated that "without a clear and express indication from Con-
gress,"' 12 there is no requirement for employers to sacrifice collectively
bargained seniority rights to accommodate the religious beliefs of an
101. See Carter, 822 F.2d at 467; see also Jansany, 755 F.2d at 1251-
1252; Carty v. Carlin, 623 F.Supp 1181, 1189 (D. Md. 1985).
102. Alexander v. Garrison, 415 U.S. 36,44 (1974).
103. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 71 (1977).
104. See id at 74.
105. 424 U.S. 747 (1975).
106. See id. at 750.
107. See id. at 773.
108. See id.
109. See id. at 774.
110. See Bowman, 424 U.S. at 774.
111. 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
112. Id. at 79.
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employee., 3 In Hardison, an employee argued that his employer was
required to accommodate his religious practice not to work Saturdays,
even if the accommodation required displacing employees protected by
a seniorityi agreement." 4 The employee's claim was based on the 1972
amendments to Title VII, which required an employer "to make reason-
able accommodations to the religious needs of employees.""' 5 In justi-
fying its preference for seniority rights over the rights of an employee
protected by Title VII, the Court relied on the Title VII provisions that
allow for seniority programs that are not part of illegal discriminatory
conduct." 5 The Court also stated that collective bargaining agreements,
including seniority provisions, are to be held in high regard because they
are important mechanisms for maintaining labor stability!7 Collective
bargaining agreements allow workers and employers the opportunity to
determine the terms and conditions of employment without resorting to
costly and disruptive labor strikes."'
Perhaps the Bowman Court was willing to displace the interests of
innocent employees due to the pervasive discriminatory conduct of the
employer, and the -effect of that conduct on a large class of
individuals." 9 This was not the case in Hardison, where the discrimina-
tion could be classified as inadvertent and affecting only one
individual. 20 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court's decision in Bowman
indicates that economic interests and rights of employees, such as sen-
iority, may be displaced to advance an important social policy.
12 1
II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF REASONABLE
ACCOMMODATION UNDER THE ADA
A recourse to an employer's refusal to accommodate an employee's
disability, may be to allege discrimination under the ADA.' Until re-
113. See id at 74-75, 79.
114. See id at 66-69.
115. Id at 66 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1968)).
116. See Hardison, 432 U.S. at 81-82.
117. See id. at 79.
118. See id,
119. See generally Franks v. Bowman, 424 U.S. 747 (1975). In Bowman
there were several classes of plaintiffs who successfully established a pattern of
long term employment discrimination. See id.
120. See generally Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
121. See Bowman, 424 U.S. at 778.
122. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994).
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cently, courts held that if an accommodation violates the provisions of a
seniority clause of a collective bargaining agreement, it is a per se un-
reasonable accommodation, and not required under the ADA.' 23 From
these decisions, it was impossible for a disabled employee plaintiff to
survive a summary judgment motion when a valid collective bargaining
agreement was in force.124
Recently however, a small minority of courts held that the presence of
a collective bargaining agreement is only one factor for determining the
reasonableness of an accommodation. 25 These courts instruct that rea-
sonableness should be made on a case-by-case basis. 2 6 In addition, the
courts charge the trier of fact with the duty to determine whether reas-
signment is a reasonable accommodation given the provisions of the
collective bargaining agreement.
127
A. Support for a "Per se " Bar: Eckles v. Consolidated
Rail Corporation
The leading case in support of the per se bar is Eckles v. Consolidated
Rail Corp.128 In Eckles, an epileptic employee sought an accommodation
for his disability through reassignment from the night shift to the day
shift. 129 The employer refused, arguing that to place Eckles on the day
shift was impossible as it was a violation of the collective bargaining
agreement's seniority provisions. 30 Therefore, the reassignment could
not occur without the consent of the union.13 1 On appeal, the Seventh
123. See Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1051 (7th Cir.
1996); see also Daigre v. Jefferson Parrish Sch. Bd., No. Civ. A. 96-0856, 1997
WL 16621 at *4 (E.D. La. Jan. 16, 1997).
124. See supra note 6 and accompanying text
125. See, e.g., Aka v. Washington Hospital Center, 116 F.3d 876 (D.C.
Cir. 1997), vacated pending rehearing en banc, 124 F.3d 1302 (D.C. Cir. 1997),
rehearing en banc, 1998 No. 96-7089, WL 698396, remanded (D.C. Cir. Oct. 9,
1998); Emrick v. Libbey-Owens Ford Co., 875 F.Supp 393 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (clas-
sifying collective bargaining agreements as one factor in determining the reason-
ableness of an accommodation).
126. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
127. See id.
128. 94 F.3d 1041 (7th Cir. 1996).
129. See id. Eckles argued the day shifts were less stressful and allowed
him a routine more conducive to avoiding epileptic seizures. See id.
130. See id.
131. See id. The district court granted the employer summary judgment
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Circuit held that the ADA does not require a preemption of seniority
provisions.13 2 Therefore, any accommodation that violated the terms of a
seniority provision was per se unreasonable.
3 3
The appeals court began its analysis with the text of the ADA. 134 The
court noted that the term "reasonable accommodation" was borrowed
from the Rehabilitation Act. 135 Under the Rehabilitation Act case law,
violations of seniority provisions under collective bargaining agree-
ments, in order to accommodate the disability of a qualified employee,
are per se unreasonable, and therefore not required of the employer.
136
The cout also considered established case law under Title VII, 37 that
held "absent a clear and expressed statement" on the part of the legisla-
ture, seniority rights under a collective bargaining agreement are not to
be forsaken in the face of a conflicting civil rights statute. 38 In other
words, the court believed collectively bargained seniority rights are
given preference over individual employee rights.13 9 The court acknowl-
edged that the precedents that previously evolved were not dispositive
on the issue of whether the ADA trumped seniority rights.140 Neverthe-
less, the court gave considerable weight to the Rehabilitation Act and
Title VII case law, stating that the case law was an important factor in
recognizing: a bar to accommodation, due to the two statutes' similarities
in purpose and terminology.1
4 1
The court also relied heavily on the anti-bumping provisions of the
holding that the ADA did not require the employer to violate the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement to make an accommodation. See id. Therefore,
the accommodation was not reasonable. See id
132. Se? id. at 1042. Eckles argued that the employer's obligations under the
ADA trumped the employer's obligations under its collective bargaining
agreement. See id. at 1045. The employer, joined by the union, again presented
the argument that the ADA did not require an infringement on seniority rights of
other employees to accommodate the disability of one. See id
133. See id. at 1047.
134. See Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1045.
135. See id. at 1047.
136. See supra note 98 and accompanying text; see also Eckles, 94 F.3d at
1047.
137. See Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1048-49.
138. See id. at 1048.
139. See id at 1051.
140. See id.
141. See id.
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ADA.142 Bumping is the displacement of one employee from a position
by another. While the statute specifically forbids bumping a non-
disabled employee to accommodate a disabled one, it did not specify the
appropriate action to take in the event there is a vacant position. 43 Un-
der the court's analysis, it is equally egregious to bump an employee
from the opportunity to accept or bid for a position, as it is to bump the
employee from the actual position.'" Therefore, the court inferred that
allowing a disabled employee to bump another employee from the op-
portunity to bid on, or accept a vacant position, is analogous and forbid-
den by the ADA. 145 The court in Eckles upheld the collective bargaining
agreement as a bar to accommodation, relying on the anti-bumping pro-
visions of the ADA, and cases interpreting the Rehabilitation Act and
Title VII.
146
The legislative history and interpretative guidelines of the ADA spec-
ify that collective bargaining agreements are only a relevant factor in the
determination of reasonableness, not a dispositive one. 147 The fact that
the court does not address this aspect of the legislative history or the
agency guidelines weakens the court's reasoning as a whole. Further-
more, ignoring Congress's intent that the reasonableness of an ADA
accommodation be evaluated on a case-by-case, totality of the circum-
stances analysis, further discredits the court's argument.
14
The court's rejection of the legislative history is important because it
is here that Congress's intent that select ADA issues, such as collective
bargaining agreements and seniority rights, be analyzed in a manner
different from the Rehabilitation Act or Title VII. It is also here that
Congress manifests its intent that reassignment is a viable accommoda-
tion.option.
Unfortunately, the misguided analysis of Eckles has created a legal
concept that subsequent courts adopted mechanically, and without fur-
142. See Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1046.
143. See id at 1047. The court defined a vacant position as one without




147. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485 pt. 2, at 63 (1990); 29 C.F.R. § 1630 &
app. (1998).
148. See generally H.R. REP. No. 101-485 pt. 2, at 63 (1990); see also 29
C.F.R. § 1630 app. (1998).
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ther scrutiny.14 9 Only a small number of courts have rejected the Eckles
court's reasoning for a per se bar.1
50
B. Aka v. Washington Hospital Center: A Balanced and
Rational Interpretation of Employer Obligation
under the ADA and NLRA
Not all :ourts adopted the rule espoused in Eckles.' s' The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia in Aka v. Washington Hospital
Center,152 rejected the per se rule in favor of an analysis that considers
collectively bargained seniority rights as one of many factors that should
be used to determine whether a reassignment is a reasonable accommo-
dation.15 3 In Aka, when a medical condition left the plaintiff unable to
perform his job responsibilities, he claimed his employer violated the
ADA by failing to accommodate his request for transfer to a light duty
position.'
54
The employer argued that the ADA did not require the plaintiff's reas-
signment because the accommodation would violate provisions of the
employer's collective bargaining agreement. 55 The employer relied on
case law from other circuits and the Rehabilitation Act to support the
argument that employers cannot be compelled to accommodate an em-
ployee whn the accommodation would violate seniority clauses of col-
lective bargaining agreements.156 The employer argued that the existence
of a valid collective bargaining agreement was a complete defense to the
plaintiff's allegation of discrimination.1
5 7
149. See, e.g., supra note 6 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
151. See Aka v. Washington Hospital Center, 116 F.3d 876 (D.C. Cir.
1997), vacaied pending rehearing en band, 124 F.3d 1302 (D.C. Cir. 1997), re-
hearing en banc, No. 96-7089, 1998 WL 698396, remanded, (D.C. Cir. Oct. 9,
1998).
152. 116 F.3d 876 (D.C. Cir. 1997), rehearing en banc, No. 96-7089, 1998
WL 698396, remanded, (D.C. Cir. Oct. 9, 1998).
153. See id at 894. A full panel subsequently determined that the issue of
a conflict was premature given the evidence did not establish a conflict between the
collective bargaining agreement terms and the ADA. Aka v. Washington Hospital
Ctr., No. 96-7089, 1998 WL 698396 at *1 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 9, 1998).
154. See Aka, 116 F.3d at 878-79.
155. See id. at 892.
156. See id at 893.
157. See id. at 892.
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On appeal, the court rejected this argument, holding that collectively
bargained seniority provisions were relevant, but not dispositive, in de-
termining whether an accommodation was reasonable. 58 The "presence
of a collective bargaining agreement could undermine the employee's
argument that the requested accommodation was reasonable or it could
strengthen the employer's claim of undue hardship."'159 The court noted
that the fact finder must weigh the presence of a collective bargaining
agreement when considering the reasonableness of an
accommodation. 60 In rejecting a per se rule, the court deferred to the
statutory language of the ADA, its legislative history, and the EEOC's
interpretative guidelines.
161
The Aka court determined that the language of the ADA allows rea-
sonable accommodation to include reassignment to a vacant position,
absent undue hardship. 162 The court also recognized that the ADA's
legislative history emphasizes Congress's intent that a conflict between
a reassignment and collective bargaining terms should be considered,
but that this conflict is not dispositive on the issue of reasonableness.
163
This legislative intent, the court noted, manifests itself in the EEOC's
interpretative guidelines, which state that collective bargaining agree-
ments are only relevant in determining unreasonableness or undue hard-
ship."64
In addition, the court noted that potentially all reasonable accommo-
dations specified by the ADA could conflict with the terms in most col-
lective bargaining agreements. 165 If the court accepts a per se rule,
whereby the terms of a collective bargaining agreement trump the ADA,
it would nullify the law's purpose of empowering the disabled in the
unionized workplace.
166
Based on this analysis, the court held that a per se bar to employee
accommodation through reassignment is an incorrect interpretation of
the purpose and intent of Title I of the ADA. 167 In its decision, the court
.158. See id. at 894-96.
159. Aka, 116 F.3d at 894-96.
160. See id. at 894.
161. See id. at 894-95.
162. See id. at 895-96.
163. See id.
164. See Aka, 116 F.3d at 895-96.
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. See id. at 895-96.
1998] Reasonable Accommodations in the Unionized Workplace 265
also rejected a per se rule permitting an employer to accommodate a
disabled employee by preempting the collectively bargained seniority
rights of the other employees.168 The court's decision rejected a blanket
rule that classifies either disabled or non-disabled interests as more de-
serving of' federal protection.169 The reasoning of the court in this in-
stance is sound, and the statutory language, legislative record, and ad-
ministrative interpretative guidelines support it.
170
This decision was vacated pending review en banc.17 1 On rehearing,
the court determined there was insufficient evidence in the. record to
establish a conflict between the ADA and the terms of the employer's
collective bargaining agreement. 72 Therefore, it was premature to ad-
dress the issue of conflict or to determine the appropriate analysis for
such a conflict.'7 The court remanded to the district court to determine
the scope of the collective bargaining agreement and whether there is
any true conflict with the proposed reassignment and the collective bar-
gaining agreement. 74 If the district court determines that a conflict ex-
ists, the initial appellate court's rationale and conclusion, that there is no
per se rule) barring accommodations that contravene collective bargain-
ing agreemients, would support a similar outcome on remand. The initial
appellate i.ourt's reasoning was in keeping with the legislative intent of
reasonableness under the ADA.1
7 5
II. THE MISTAKE OF ECKLES: WHY A FACT-SPECIFIC
CONSIDERATION OF ALL FACTORS IS PROPER
The purpose of the ADA is to eradicate the pervasive discrimination
168. See id
169. See Aka, 116 F.3d at 896. The court remanded the issue for a
determination of whether a failure to find a position for the plaintiff was
unreasonab][e, taking into consideration the seniority provisions, as well as all other
circumstances. See id at 897.
170. See generally, 29 U.S.C. §§ 12101 - 12117 (1994); H.R. REP. No.
101-485, pt. 2 & 3 (1990); 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.00-1630.17 & app. (1998).
171. Aka v. Washington Hospital Center, 116 F.3d 876 (D.C. Cir. 1997),
vacated pending rehearing en banc, 124 F.3d 1302 (D.C. Cir. 1997), rehearing en
banc, No. 9 6-7089, 1998 WL 698396, remanded (D.C. Cir. Oct. 9, 1998).
172. Aka v. Washington Hospital Ctr., No. 96-7089, 1998 WL 698396 at
'17-18 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 9, 1998).
173. See id
174. See id. at 19.
175. See generally H.R. REP. No. 101-485 pt. 2 at 65.
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against the disabled. 17 6 Elimination of this bias is essential because the
historic workplace exclusion of the disabled resulted in increased costs
to the nation in the form of economic dependency and worker non-
production.'" Institution of the reasonable accommodation provisions of
the ADA was necessary to guarantee meaningful opportunity for partici-
pation in the employment market for those individuals with
disabilities.
78
When a situation forces an employer to choose between making an
accommodation or upholding the seniority provisions of its collective
bargaining agreement, the conflict is not necessarily employee versus
employer. 7 9 Rather the conflict involves disabled employee versus non-
disabled employee. 180 Regardless of the characterization of the conflict,
the employer must choose between protecting and advancing the inter-
ests of the individual or the interests of the collective group.
Collective bargaining agreements are highly valued in this country.' 8'
Collective bargaining agreements are an effective and enforceable
method of reducing workplace strife and labor uncertainty. 8 2 These
agreements allow for a more productive workforce 8 3 They are at the
core of our national labor policy and uniformly include seniority provi-
sions.' 4 Seniority provisions are a respected and neutral method of allo-
cating scarce employment benefits. 8 5 The Supreme Court held that only
in the most egregious instances, required to remedy a past pattern of
employment discrimination, will a court violate collective bargaining
agreements.1
8 6
However, concern for the employment rights of the disabled is equally
176. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (1994).
177. See id. § 12101(9).
178. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485 pt. 2, at 63.
179. See Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1046 (7th Cir.
1996).
180. See id.
181. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 79 (1977).
182. See id. Due to the competitive advantage enjoyed by employers, pro-
tecting the rights of workers to collectively join together to address workplace is-
sues results in less workplace strife and negative economic impact on commerce.
See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1994).
183. See id
184. See Hardison, 432 U.S. at 79.
185. See Lorace v. AT&T Techs. Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989).
186. See Franks v. Bowman, 424 U.S. 747, 787-88 (1975).
1998] Reasonable Accommodations in the Unionized Worlace 267
compelling. As noted in the opening provisions of the ADA, the rights
of the disabled have been violated to such a degree, that the economic
well-being of not only the disabled employee, but the country as a whole
is affected negatively. 8 7 This is caused by the economic dependence of
the disabled on welfare, disability, and social security.
88
A. Removing the Heavy Hand of a "Per se" Bar
Adoption of a per se bar to reassignment would place seniority provi-
sions over the rights of disabled employees. This is considerably more
protection than Congress intended to give collectively bargained senior-
ity rights. 89 An alternative rule allowing the ADA to always trump col-
lectively bargained seniority rights is also an inappropriate extension of
congressional intent.
190
As was the practice under the Rehabilitation Act, Congress intended
ADA issues to be determined using a fact-specific, case-by-case analy-
sis.' 9' Congress based the determination of whether an accommodation
is reasonable, or whether it would impose an undue hardship to the em-
ployer, on. a number of factors, none of which alone are dispositive of
the issue. 92 A court should look to the "practical realities of the situa-
tion" before rendering a decision. 93 The per se bar ignores congres-
sional intent as embodied in the House Committee Reports, the EEOC
guidelines, as well as, the specific language of the statute 94
The House Committee Report specifically states that collective bar-
gaining agreements are relevant in determining the reasonableness of an
accommodation. 195 This statement does not support the proposition that
187. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(9)(a) (1994) (Disability discrimination "costs
the United States billions in unnecessary expenses resulting from dependency and
non-productivity.").
188. See id.
189. See Aka v. Washington Hospital Center, 116 F.3d 876 (D.C. Cir.
1997), vacated pending rehearing en banc, 124 F.3d 1302 (D.C. Cir. 1997), re-
hearing en banc, No. 96-7089, 1998 WL 698396, remanded, (D.C. Cir. Oct. 9,
1998).
190. See id.
191. See H.R. REP. No.101-485, pt. 2, at 62 (1990).
192. See id at 67; H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 41-42.
193. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 68.
194. See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 12101 - 12117 (1994); H.R. REP. No.
101-485, pt. 2 & 3 (1990); 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.00-1630.17 & app. (1998).
195. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2 (1990).
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a collective bargaining agreement, and seniority provisions contained
within, are dispositive on the issue of reasonableness. 196 Furthermore,
the report labels seniority rights as one factor in determining reason-
ableness, not the only factor.
197
The EEOC's interpretative guidelines also classify collective bar-
gaining agreements as only relevant, not dispositive, in determining
whether an accommodation is so disruptive to the workforce as to con-
stitute undue hardship. 198 Though lacking force of law, this interpreta-
tion of statutory obligations by the administrative agency authorized by
Congress to interpret and enforce the ADA is persuasive.
The ADA drafters did not simply overlook inserting language detail-
ing the precise value of collective bargaining provisions. Congress was
aware of the conflicts that could arise between ADA and NLRA em-
ployer obligations.' 99 In acknowledging the potential conflict, Congress
suggested that future collective bargaining agreements should address
the problem by including a provision that allows the employer to modify
its contract terms to accommodate the ADA. 200 It is important to note
that Congress specifically addressed this issue in other statutes, such as
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and Title VII,
which both provide specific protection for the seniority rights of unpro-
tected employees, but Congress nevertheless chose to remain silent on
this issue within the ADA.20'
Some commentators suggest that Congress's intent was to apply Re-
habilitation Act case law to the conflict between the ADA and NLRA
employer obligations. 0 2 Case law under the Rehabilitation Act may ap-
ply to identical provisions of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.
203
However, it is difficult to apply this case law to ADA issues when the
provisions are different.20 4 Under the ADA, job reassignment is specifi-
cally mentioned in the statute as a reasonable method of accommoda-
196. See id.
197. See id.
198. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(d) (1997).
199. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485 pt. 2, at 63.
200. See id
201. Dubault, supra note 3, at 1285 (citing to 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(2)
(1994)).
202. See id
203. See Gile v. United Airlines, Inc., 95 F.3d 492, 496-97 (7th Cir. 1996).
204. See Dubault, supra note 3, at 1285.
1998] Reasonable Accommodations in the Unionized Workplace 269
tion.205 There is no comparable language in the Rehabilitation Act speci-
fying reassignment as a possible accommodation. 20 6 Congress's intent
when addressing the possible conflict should not be analyzed under Re-
habilitation Act case law, because the Rehabilitation Act addresses a
different legislative scheme and legal issue. The weight given any par-
ticular factor in determining reasonableness and/or undue hardship is
unspecified in the ADA or the EEOC guidelines. Congress realized that
in practice, relevant factors would differ from one situation to another,
and the w,.ight given any one factor was not dependent on the factor, but
was dependent on the circumstances surrounding the factors.0 7
The per se rule consists of solely one factor, the presence of a valid
collective bargaining agreement, which is dispositive of the issue
whether the ADA or the NLRA should prevail. The per se rule rejects
legislative intent, and does not account for the actual effect that a viola-
tion of those seniority provisions would have on other employees. A
balancing test that measures and accounts for: (1) the actual infringe-
ment on the collectively bargained rights of non-disabled employees, (2)
the associated employer costs for that infringement, (3) the employment
rights of disabled employees, (4) the legislative intent and purpose of
eradicating disability discrimination and expanding employment oppor-
tunities, and (5) the strong public policies favoring labor and economic
stability, would adhere to Congress's intent.
B. Balancing the Interests of All Employees
Implementing a balancing test, rather than a bright line rule, is the
appropriaite method for evaluating the reasonableness of an accommo-
dation under the ADA. 20 8 This balancing test measures the intrusion on
the employment rights of the non-disabled, the associated costs to the
employer, and the public's desire for labor stability. The balancing test
weighs these factors against the rights of disabled employees to fully
participate in the employment market and the public's desire for an end
to disability discrimination in the workplace.
205. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (1994).
206. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 791.
207. See generally Aka v. Washington Hospital Center, 116 F.3d 876
(D.C. Cir. 1997), vacated pending rehearing en banc, 124 F.3d 1302 (D.C. Cir.
1997), rehearing en banc, No. 96-7089, 1998 WL 698396, remanded, (D.C. Cir.
Oct. 9, 1998).
208. See Dubault, supra note 3, at 1299.
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When measuring an intrusion on the rights of a disabled employee,
the actual terms of a collective bargaining agreement should take prece-
dence. A per se rule does not account for the individuality of each col-
lective bargaining agreement where the terms and conditions of em-
ployment, as well as the structure of the employer-union relationship,
may vary. 209 For example, a seniority clause could mandate filling open
positions with the employee who meets the minimum job requirements
and is the most senior. Though most seniority provisions are more com-
plicated, when reassigning a disabled employee into a position that is
part of such a seniority provision, the actual infringement on the rights
of other employees would depend in large part, on the number of em-
ployees who meet the stipulated minimum job requirement. 210 The
greater the number of employees who meet the minimum job require-
ments, the larger the number of employees the employer displaces when
accommodating a disabled employee. 2 1 The greater the displacement,
the greater the weight accorded the seniority provision in determining
whether to violate the collective bargaining agreement to accommodate
the disabled employee.
212
In the alternative, if few employees meet the minimum job require-
ments, the displacement is significantly lower, especially if those dis-
placed employees are able to secure comparable positions in a short pe-
riod of time.
In determining the impact of the infringement, it is also important to
consider other contract provisions that may mitigate the effect of an in-
fringement. For example, a provision that gives the employer discretion
to suspend the terms of the seniority agreement would demonstrate that
an accommodation of a disabled employee is no more an infringement
upon the rights of other employees than already existed under their cur-
rent collective bargaining agreement.2 3 In Aka, the applicable collective
bargaining agreement authorized an exception to the seniority provisions
that allowed the employer to fill vacancies with reassigned disabled
209. See Aka, 116 F.3d at 894-95.
210. See Dubault, supra note 3, at 1299.
211. See id
212. See generally Dubault, supra note 3, at 1298-99 (discussing
infringement on employee expectation interest under collective bargaining
agreements).
213. See generally Aka, 116 F.3d at 894-95 (noting the employer opt-out
provision for reassigning disabled employees).
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workers. 2114 The employer is able to fill vacancies when he believes it
would be "feasible" and would not interfere with patient care or the
normal operation of the hospital.215 These provisions demonstrate that
the expectations of non-disabled employees have not substantially been
violated because the seniority expectations were already limited by the
employer discretion provision.216 In these instances, courts should give
little weight to the seniority clause in evaluating the reasonableness of
reassignment. Evaluating the effect of seniority clauses is a superior
method of analysis in comparison to the per se rule, because such an
evaluation considers actual harm to the employment rights of those em-
ployees covered by the collective bargaining agreement. In contrast, the
per se rule assumes every violation is a major intrusion on the collec-
tively bargained employment rights of other employees.
217
Another factor that must be balanced against the disabled employee's
interest, is the employer cost associated with a reassignment that contra-
venes the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. Under federal la-
bor law, an employer violates the NLRA if it allows a reassignment
without the union's consent.1 8 If an employer proceeds without the con-
sent of the union, the employer may face substantial litigation costs and
labor disputes that interfere with business operations. 219 Such disputes
may have a negative economic impact on the surrounding communities,
financial markets, and related industries.220 These associated expenses
may qualify as an undue hardship if they are costly, substantial, and dis-
ruptive.Y However, this will not always be the case. The collective bar-
gaining history of the parties involved may affect how labor and man-
agement respond to labor grievances.
The final factor that impacts the balancing analysis is the public pol-
icy that encourages labor stability and the preservation of collectively
bargained rights. nt It is this public policy that led to the promulgation of
214. See id
215. See id.
216. See Dubault, supra note 3, at 1299.
217. See id
218. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5)(d) (1994).
219. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
220. See id.
221. See Dubault, supra note 3, at 1274.
222. See generally Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977);
Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041 (7th Cir. 1996) (discussing the
importance: of labor stability as a reason for giving labor agreements great
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the NLRA.223
The presence of any of the above mentioned factors, is not in itself
dispositive of the issue of whether an accommodation is reasonable or
creates an undue hardship. 224 Rather, the weight each factor is given is
based on the circumstances unique to each employment environment.
After weighing the interests on both sides, the Weight of each factor will
assist the court in determining which legitimate interest should prevail.
C. Application of a Balancing Test to Aka and Eckles
The likely result of applying the balancing test in Aka, is the em-
ployee prevailing on the failure-to-accommodate claim due to the col-
lective bargaining agreement's employer discretion provision.22 An
accommodation through reassignment to a light duty position would be
no more burdensome on the expectations of other employees because the
employer discretion provision already created a diminished
expectation.
226
In Eckles, the use of the balancing test would most likely result in a
similar outcome as under the per se bar. The accommodation sought by
the plaintiff in Eckles would have displaced not only the employee Eck-
les replaced, but also could have potentially displaced every employee
qualified for the position under the seniority agreement who desired a
transfer to the day shift. Given that day shifts were in high demand,227 it
would be likely that Eckles' accommodation would have displaced a
significant number of employees, depriving them of a significant em-
ployment benefit. Accordingly, the seniority clause in the collective
bargaining agreement should have tremendous weight in light of the
significant displacement. It is unlikely that an accommodation in this
situation would be reasonable. Application of a balancing test allows for
the fact specific, case-by-case analysis desired by Congress that is ab-
deference).
223. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1994) (discussing purpose of the
NLRA).
224. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 63; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630
(1997).
225. See generally Aka v. Washington Hospital Center, 116 F.3d 876, 895
(D.C. Cir. 1997) (discussing Washington Hospital Center's labor agreement's opt-
out provision that allows reassignment at the hospital's discretion).
226. See id.
227. Ecldes, 94 F.3d at 1043-44.
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sent under a broad per se rule.
A disabled employee's right to be free from discrimination in the
workplace is critical, especially when coupled with society's interest in
preventing such discrimination. When a court hears a case involving a
collective bargaining agreement, which inadvertently discriminates
against the disabled, the court should undertake a fact-specific analysis
before determining whose interests should prevail. Per se rules are over-
broad because they mechanically grant disposition of the case without
accurately weighing the actual infringement against the benefit gained.
A balancing test, as proposed here, most closely adopts the flexible,
case-by-case analysis that Congress intended.228
Unfortunately, a case-by-case analysis does not address the concerns
of employers faced with litigation irrespective of their grant of an ac-
commodation. A per se rule allows employers some measure of protec-
tion against litigation if they decide not to grant a reassignment accom-
modation. However, the rule would still contravene the statutory intent.
Ignoring the statutory language and congressional intent is an inappro-
priate method to address employer liability concerns. Those concerns
are best addressed through cooperation between the EEOC and NLRB.
These agencies should continue to work to adopt a joint interpretation
for public guidance.
CONCLUSION
The options courts have when confronted with conflicts between the
ADA and the NLRA are varied. Some courts adopt a per se rule that
gives dispositive weight to seniority clauses. This option gives no con-
sideration to the rights and interests of the disabled employee. Further-
more, it ignores society's interest in the disabled person being a produc-
tive member of the workforce. In addition, the per se bar does not con-
sider the actual infringement an accommodation in violation of seniority
clauses may have on the economic interests of other employees.
Courts may also adopt a per se rule giving the reassignment provision
preference over collectively bargained tseniority clauses. This would
allow the employer's ADA obligations to trump its obligations under the
collective bargaining agreement and the NLRA. This option ignores the
strong support and sanctity that society affords collective bargaining
agreements and seniority rights. It also ignores the expectations of em-
228. See generally H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3 (1990) (discussing Con-
gressional intent regarding collective bargaining agreements and the ADA).
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ployees who are covered by collective bargaining agreements. These
expectations contribute to a stable labor environment. In both instances,
a per se bar in favor of the collective bargaining agreement, or in favor
of the ADA provisions, unfairly penalizes the interests represented by
the ADA or the interests protected by the NLRA.
The best option is a balancing test that considers all factors in deter-
mining whether an accommodation is in fact reasonable, or whether it
would cause undue hardship for the employer. In making this balanced
determination, the court should look to the actual provisions of the col-
lective bargaining agreement, the associated employer costs, and pay
deference to the public policies that place a high regard on labor stabil-
ity and eradication of workplace discrimination. It is the proposed bal-
ancing model that most closely mirrors congressional intent.
Kymberly D. Hankinson
